

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Counselor and Chairman
Policy Planning Council
Washington

~~TOP SECRET~~

October 27, 1962

TO: Mr. McGeorge Bundy
FROM: W.W. Rostow
SUBJECT: Report Number Four of the Planning Subcommittee.

1. The Planning Subcommittee considered the situation as of Saturday morning, October 27, 1962.

2. The preliminary assessment of the various diplomatic signals from Moscow suggests, on balance, a greater willingness than had previously been assessed for Moscow to disengage from the Cuba crisis without extracting any net advantage and barely saving face. They will, of course, assess the U. S. and Free World reactions to their various initiatives and be quick to exploit any hesitancy or weakness on our part and any substantial schisms that may emerge in the Free World front.

3. While we engage in various forms of communication, it is judged essential that we maintain a focus on the missile sites and bombers in Cuba, escalate modestly our current pressure and forecast more decisive action unless the Cuban crisis is quickly settled on terms which sacrifice no Free World asset, except the lifting of the blockade.

4. The Planning assignments under 3 a, b, and c in Report Number Three (POL, air strike, and negotiating track) have all been completed and sent forward to the Executive Committee. Item 3 d (political action vis-a-vis Cuba) is under way under ARA responsibility. The daily assessment of Soviet intentions and a suggested appropriate posture for the U.S. will continue. The Navy continues the task of defining rules of engagement for conflict in defense of the integrity of the blockade; and Mr. McNaughton is completing an analysis of the ships now en route to Cuba with possible courses of action.

~~TOP SECRET~~

3/3/75 NLK-75-102
MFO 4/10/75

~~TOP SECRET~~

-2-

5. Since planning for more drastic measures, should they be required, is well in hand, the Planning Subcommittee has begun to turn to courses of action which might be followed if the crisis is quickly settled on terms which meet our fundamental position. If this outcome should emerge, it is strongly felt that: (a) a fresh assessment of the Soviet position, in the light of its thrust for Cuba and reaction to our moves, is essential; (b) we should move rapidly to exploit our success by moving urgently to consolidate the Atlantic partnership; to consolidate gains in the OAS; to accelerate the Alliance for Progress; and to seek out other ways to exploit the interval of momentum such success will open to us.

~~TOP SECRET~~